Laughter and collective awareness: The cinema auditorium as public space by Hanich, Julian
  
 University of Groningen
Laughter and collective awareness: The cinema auditorium as public space
Hanich, Julian
Published in:
NECSUS European Journal of Media Studies
DOI:
10.5117/NECSUS2014.2.HANI
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2014
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Hanich, J. (2014). Laughter and collective awareness: The cinema auditorium as public space. NECSUS
European Journal of Media Studies, 3(2). https://doi.org/10.5117/NECSUS2014.2.HANI
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Laughter and collective awareness: The cinema
auditorium as public space
Julian Hanich
NECSUS ３ (２): ４３–６２
DOI: １０.１５５７/NECSUS２０１４.２.HANI
Abstract
This article looks at how the collective experience of laughter in the movie
theater is related to the idea of the cinema as a public space. Through the non-
verbal expression of laughter the audience ‘constructs’ a public space the
viewersmay not have been aware of to the same degree prior to the collective
public expression. Moreover, the public space created through laughter
allows for an expedient type of monitoring: inappropriate laughter may be
exposed in front of others. With viewers who laugh approvingly about racist
violence or misogynist jokes, we can easily lay bare the ethical implications.
Keywords: laughter, cinema, collective experience, Charles Taylor, Walter Benjamin
１ Introduction
‘[L]aughter allows the audience to become aware of itself.’ This brief state-
ment by André Bazin uttered in passing in his second article on ‘Theater
and Cinema’ harbors a number of thought-provoking ideas.１ The main goal
of my article will be to examine what Bazin’s sentence may imply for the
collective experience of laughter in the cinema. A second and more far-
reaching goal is to expand arguments I put forth previously in favor of a
systematic phenomenology of the collective experience of the movie thea-
ter.２ The co-presence of (predominantly) anonymous others often has a
strong effect on our film experience – particularly once emotions and
emotional expressions come into play. Astonishingly, this audience effect
has not yet undergone systematic scrutiny in the history of film theory.
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Taking collective laughter about an apparently funny scene as an obvious
starting point, I want to put forward two arguments.
First, drawing on an idea by the philosopher Charles Taylor, I will claim
that certain kinds of non-verbal expression – most importantly laughter,
but also screaming, moaning, booing, hissing, and other emotional re-
sponses – have an important function in the cinema. They ‘construct’ a
public space the viewers may not have been aware of to the same degree
prior to the collective public expression. Although we, as viewers, might
tacitly assume that we all find a particular scene funny, laughter makes this
common emotional response openly available and thus turns the cinema
into a public space in a more emphatic sense. Laughter allows the audi-
ence to become aware of itself as a social group with shared emotions. We
could call this the ‘collective awareness function’ of cinematic laughter.
Second, by reinterpreting an enigmatic passage fromWalter Benjamin’s
famous artwork essay I will claim that the public space created through
laughter allows for an expedient type of monitoring or control. It is only
because laughter as an expressive response makes an emotional judgment
of a particular scene publically available that we have knowledge about
what people find worthy of laughter in the first place. Cinematic laughter
thus literally becomes revelatory: only in a public space like the movie
theater will inappropriate or even ethically-questionable laughter be ex-
posed in front of others. With viewers who approvingly laugh about racist
violence or misogynist jokes in mind we can easily lay bare the ethical
implications. Public spaces like the cinema may spark an open debate
about (and thus a monitoring of) dubious kinds of laughter. In this case
laughter allows the other audience members to become aware of what
they want to admit as acceptable and what they prefer to avoid as inap-
propriate laughter.３ We may dub this the ‘control function’ of cinematic
laughter.
２ The collective awareness function of laughter: Charles
Taylor’s Entre Nous
Following Charles Taylor I want to draw attention to an important social
phenomenon that he reserves a French name for: entre nous. The term
refers to a common awareness that a certain fact is now between-us or
amongst-us. In this section I will show that this type of intersubjectivity
has interesting ramifications for laughter in the cinema as well as for a
theory and phenomenology of collective spectatorship at the movies.
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Taylor’s primary aim is to challenge representational theories of language.
Following Herder, Humboldt, and Heidegger he stresses the activity of
speaking rather than the designative function of language. For Taylor the
expressive aspect of speech is more fundamental than the descriptive di-
mension. However, for our context something else is more important.
Taylor gives us the example of two strangers on a train travelling on a hot
day. The two men look at each other and one of them says: ‘Whew, it’s hot!’
This act of communication most probably does not convey information
both did not already know. Both of them knew it was hot and both knew
that the other must have known it was hot. So what should be the point in
communicating? Taylor argues that by making this common knowledge
public the act of communication transforms the situation. The sentence
‘Whew, it’s hot!’ establishes what has not been there before: a public
space, a common vantage point, something that is for us, or as Taylor
puts it, entre nous. Taylor writes:
human communication doesn’t just transmit information. It doesn’t
just produce, e.g., some belief in the hearer. It brings about the acknowl-
edgement that some matter is entre nous. . . . to grasp that something is
entre nous involves more than grasping that thing; it involves seeing that it
is present to us in a certain way, that is, in public space; or to take it from a
different angle, that the subject(s) to whom this is present is the two of us
together, and no longer just you and I individually.４
Taylor explicitly rejects monological models of the subject that take all
states of awareness, knowledge, belief, attending to as mere states of in-
dividuals – as if our awareness that something is between us could be
analyzed as your being aware of plus my being aware of. Instead, Taylor
argues that once something is expressed it is lifted, as it were, to a higher
level. It creates a public space.
I think that the kind of communication Taylor has in mind could also
occur through other means than language (for instance through laughter)
and in a different setting (for instance in the movie theater). As social
philosopher Margaret Gilbert specifies:
Taylor focuses on the power of language to ‘found public space’ or to
‘place certain matters before us’. And, clearly, a linguistic act may perform
the transformation . . . . He allows, however, that this transformation may
occur through any mode of ‘expression’ – where expression need not be
linguistic.５
Even though Taylor uses a linguistic example all kinds of non-verbal
expressions can work for establishing something entre nous. By enumerat-
ing some of these non-verbal expressions we can see how Taylor’s argu-
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ment may become pertinent for the collective experience of the movie
theater. Just think of a screaming, applauding, or booing audience; or con-
sider people who express their disgust by moaning. As we shall see, laugh-
ter can also function in a similar way as the ‘Whew, it’s hot!’ sentence.
Laughter conveys information; the laughing person signals that he or
she finds a scene funny. However, this information is sometimes not the
crucial point, because its content may have been tacitly presupposed any-
way. Even without laughter I might have surmised that my partner finds
the film funny, because I saw her smile about the gag in the Woody Allen
film from the corner of my eyes; I might have been quite sure because she
likes all Jacques Tati or Will Ferrell comedies; and, I might have even been
fully certain that she loves What’s Up, Doc?, because I know it is one of her
favorite films. What seems at least equally important is that laughter trans-
forms the situation between those laughing out loud. When two or more
people laugh it establishes a common vantage point, a public space be-
tween them, an entre nous. It raises an awareness of something that the
viewers are now, to a certain extent, aware of together. Laughter thus not
only has a communicative function (‘we share the information that we find
this scene funny’) but also a collective-awareness function (‘we are now
aware that in this public space we find this funny together’). What may
have been knowledge of you and me separately and individually is now in
the open and entre nous. It is something for us and for us together. Taylor
writes:
I want to claim that what we recognize as full communication always
has this feature of our coming together in that something is made an object
for us, where this is something stronger than its being just an object sev-
erally for me and for you, and my knowing that you know, and your know-
ing that I know, and my knowing that you know that I know, etc., up to any
level that we can cope with. For in this type of case, no matter how refined
by looped knowledge about the other’s knowledge about my knowledge,
we have something quite different from communication.６
Taylor does not argue that this implies we have to ponder the matter. To
argue that grasping what is entre nous involves a fully ‘reflective’ stance
could be misleading; ‘reflection’ in a strong sense of the word is not re-
quired in most of our communications. He writes:
to be capable of human communication requires that we be sensitive to
not just the things communicated about, but the way in which they are
present or evident to us, and particularly to the subject(s) to whom they
are present. This sensitivity has a reflexive dimension, therefore, whereby
we are not just aware of some matter, but also responding to how we are
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aware and who is aware. There is a second-order component which is
irreducibly present, however little we reflect on it, in the sense of taking it
for our focus . . . .７
Laughing together raises our mutual awareness that we find this or that
funny, even if we don’t fully reflect on it in the sense of, ‘Wow, isn’t it
amazing that we all find this funny!’ In the cinema there are good reasons
why non-linguistic communication like laughter predominates over
speech. It has at least two advantages when compared to linguistic com-
munication. First, it does not make highly demanding calls on one’s con-
sciousness; making a verbal comment on the film grosso modomeans more
distraction. Laughter, instead, allows the viewer to follow the ongoing
narrative more smoothly. Laughing is therefore an effective way of com-
municating and simultaneously pursuing other interests such as watching a
film.８ Second, language can become a barrier in the act of communal com-
munication. Laughter here offers a nice solution as it helps to integrate
anonymous others more easily. As sociologist Jack Katz tells us:
[j]ust because words are so effective in conveying finely differentiated import, if
too many people speak at the same time, no one knows what anyone is saying.
With laughter, any number can play and all can be assured from moment to
moment that they are nevertheless in the same game.９
When six or 60 or even 600 persons scream a sentence this creates caco-
phonic noise, but it raises little mutual awareness. In contrast, when in the
darkness of the cinema everybody looks directly at the screen, laughing out
loud is a highly efficient way to establish something entre nous. This is, of
course, not to deny that there are varieties of amused laughter that come in
different shades of intensity, duration, and even prosody. While one viewer
might find a scene intensely funny and thus displays his or her passionate
involvement, another viewer may consider it only mildly funny and there-
fore laughs somewhat distantly. Hence we can expect ‘differences in same-
ness’ even amongst a group of people who are amused and share their
emotional judgment by and large.
By establishing a public space in the theater the laughing viewers partly
and momentarily withdraw from their immersive film experience. Instead
they become (to a somewhat higher degree than before) aware of the
theatrical experience they share with others. Even if laughter does not
draw one’s attention away from the film completely (its cognitive effort
is, as I said, comparatively small), it still does so to a certain degree. In fact,
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we may expect that the funnier a scene is the more withdrawn from the
film the viewers may be. This is true for two reasons.
First, laughter provoked by a comedy is an eruptive, outward-moving
bodily response. Since laughter puts the body in motion the more eruptive
the laughter the more difficult to sustain immersion in the filmic world. As
viewers we may even rock our torso, slap our knees, hold our stomach, and
stomp our feet (the movement that comes with laughter is a point I will
return to with regard to Benjamin). Second, the funnier the scene and the
more communal the laughter the louder and the more conspicuous it will
be. When 60 or even 600 people laugh we become all the more aware of
the co-presence of others. This is a point also underscored by Steve Neale
and Frank Krutnik: ‘with comedy laughter “disrupts” the “passively con-
sumed” dramatic illusionism and one is pulled away from the world repre-
sented on the screen and is united with other spectators as part of an
audience’.１０ This is why for theorists like Walter Benjamin or Julia Kristeva
laughter has an important anti-ideological function; it prevents a powerful
illusionary effect of the film and grounds the viewer in the here and now of
the movie theater with co-present others.１１
With the example of laughter in mind I would like to refine Taylor’s
points in two respects. First, I believe that this mutual awareness raised
through laughter is not a question of either-or – it is a matter of degrees.
When I am sitting in the cinema and share laughter with others this might
be considered a weak form of mutual awareness; when we look at each
other and exchange glances while laughing this might be amedium form of
mutual awareness; and when we point to the screen, show two thumbs up,
or even let our laughter be followed by a quick exchange of verbal com-
ments, then we might talk of a strong form of mutual awareness. Hence
there are gradations on a continuum in terms of our mutual awareness
through laughter. Second, one may broadly claim that the degree of mutual
awareness is inversely proportional to the range of people included. As
Taylor notes:
[t]he nous among whom I make some matter an acknowledged common object
can be everyone. I can declare things urbi et orbi.１２
However, the degree of mutual awareness is not as strong between me and
all the others out there in the orbi of the cinema auditorium as it is
between me and the neighbors sitting next to me. All this is not to deny
that the situation in the cinema is often more complicated than Taylor’s
situation on the bus. As we have seen, Taylor gives us the example of the
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two strangers to underline that communication is not necessarily a matter
of information, because the facts seem obvious. However, in the cinema,
due to the darkness, the unidirectional viewing position, and the back of
the seats, I often do not presuppose that the others find the scene funny.
The examples I have given above of viewers who surmise the responses of
others or are even fully certain about them despite the fact that the reac-
tions were not expressed acoustically referred to immediate neighbors and
well-known persons (such as one’s girlfriend). In the movie theater I usual-
ly do not know the majority of other viewers sitting in the dark. Neither
can I properly see their facial expression responding to the film (for in-
stance, their display of an amused smile); nor would I expect them to share
my humor when it comes to this particular film (for instance, because I am
a German watching a German comedy in Moscow).
In situations like this laughter certainly does inform me about some-
thing less-than-obvious. First, it can convey deictic information by referring
to and acoustically pointing at an event or content: ‘Look, this is funny!’
This happens to me regularly when abroad. The nuances of a particular
humor slip my attention and I gratefully accept the notification that this is
funny so that I have something to laugh at myself. Second, since we do not
laugh continuously and about everything, we can single something out by
responding with laughter to just this scene: ‘Look, this – and precisely this –
is funny!’ Third, laughter has a personal communicative function over and
above the deictic one as it corresponds to something about the person
laughing: ‘Look, this – and precisely this – is funny for me!’ Admitting that
laughter is communicating important information does not do harm to the
argument that it also establishes a collective awareness.
Due to the structural features of the movie theater the situation is more
complicated than in Taylor’s example for a second reason. Taylor points
out that in order to establish collective awareness, and thus to create a
public space, someone must take a first step. If the man on the bus had not
exclaimed, ‘Whew, it’s hot!’, the mutual awareness between him and the
other passenger would have remained implicit at best. It would not have
been raised to a higher level and brought out into the open between the
two men. Likewise, in the cinema someone has to laugh in order to estab-
lish something entre nous. However, in the cinema it is not enough that a
single person laughs out loud. Solitary laughter can create a peculiar im-
balance or asymmetry. A second person in the auditorium, who finds the
scene equally funny but remains silent, may now be aware that both he
and the laughing person have something in common and share a feeling.
Yet the laughing person herself may not know that the other viewers find
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the scene funny – and may therefore feel uncomfortably left alone. While
on the bus the exclamation ‘Whew, it’s hot!’ does not need approval be-
cause the facts are obvious, in the cinema the solitary laughter needs con-
firmation in order to raise a balanced, symmetrical kind of collective
awareness. One reason is the uncertainty based on the aforementioned
structural features of the movie theater. Therefore laughter also expresses
a wish: ‘Look, this – and precisely this – is funny for me, but hopefully also
for you and hence for us!’ Helmuth Plessner once noted that the laughing
person becomes truly joyous only when he or she knows that the laughter
rings out and is heard:
[t]he occasion of laughter . . . has an effect which is all the more pronounced,
the more ‘objective’ it seems. And it seems more objective to the degree that
others are also struck by it. To that extent it requires endorsement by others
and gains strength in community.１３
We subjectively need confirmation by others that something is objectively
funny in order to create the common vantage point of the entre nous.
Laughter can therefore also be equivalent to an invitation: ‘Look, this –
and precisely this – is funny for me, but definitely also for you!’ Sometimes
one might even feel the need to issue a license to laugh. Think of a case
when you feel the need to show others that it is allowed and appropriate to
laugh. Watching a German comedy in the Netherlands, I once came to the
conclusion that the Dutch viewers either do not understand the German
humor (which does exist!) or that they do not find it funny enough to give
it credit. Either way I found it necessary for both my own and their enjoy-
ment to stimulate and invite them, to indicate that this is indeed ‘worth’
laughing about. I laughed forcefully and insistently, since I felt the need to
‘break through’ their ‘wall of silence’ – but this insistence can itself be risky.
When the other viewers remain stubbornly silent the laughing person may
begin to wonder whether the others consider his or her humor strange – a
situation evoking embarrassment. It can also elicit anger about the others
who do not laugh and thus refuse to participate in what, for the laughing
person, seems to be an evident reason to respond expressively.１４
Laughter in the cinema can fulfill a plethora of functions, and certainly
not all of them have been mentioned here. For instance, one may object to
my account by asking if laughter about something comical or funny is first
and foremost a bodily response – an eruptive response to a crisis situation
that seems contradictory and unanswerable and in which the body takes
over from the person, as Helmuth Plessner would put it. It would be short-
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sighted to overlook this bodily component.１５ However, the bodily response
of laughter is much more prominent in public. Robert Provine claims that
people are 30 times more likely to laugh in the presence of others than
when they are alone.１６ Even if some people do laugh wholeheartedly alone,
say in front of a television screen, this would not be a lethal objection to
my argument, because in the movie theater laughter simply takes over both
a communicative role and a collective awareness function as well.
One could also complain that my argument overlooks that establishing
something entre nous does not necessarily imply everyone has to agree:
there are persons who laugh along because of peer pressure (a point I will
return to). There may always be persons who do not consider themselves
part of this ‘for us’. When a person on a bus suffering from influenza
experiences a moment of rigor or chill he or she does certainly not feel
included in the public space established by the exclamation ‘Whew, it’s
hot!’ Likewise, in the cinema someone who does not find the film funny at
all may feel excluded and thus does not consider him or herself part of the
laughing community. Laughter therefore sometimes has an exclusionary
function: ‘Look, this – and precisely this – is funny for us, but not for others!’
The inclusion and exclusion function of laughter is a commonplace in
sociological theories of laughter;１７ even in biology this has been known
for a long time. Some 50 years ago the biologist Konrad Lorenz pointed
out that laughter ‘produces simultaneously a strong fellow-feeling among
participants and joint aggressiveness against outsiders’.１８ Again, this is not
a fatal objection, because those who are included may still be collectively
aware of their common laughter.
In turn, the experience of feeling excluded from a laughing community
can itself be highly relevant and revelatory in moments of inadequate
laughter. When viewers laugh about racist violence or a misogynist joke
those who do not laugh may become aware of the social distance that
separates them; they realise the gap between what they find inacceptable
and what others consider as worthy of laughter. In this case laughter may
create a public awareness of another kind. The public place of the movie
theater thus allows for beneficial monitoring, which is not possible if the
laughter is merely private. Interestingly, elements of this ‘control function’
of cinematic laughter can already be found in Benjamin’s famous artwork
essay – one of the few places in canonical film theory where the ‘simulta-
neous collective experience’ of the movie theater assumes a significant
role. As should become clear in the following discussion, precisely because
the viewer’s film experience is a collective one in the movie theater it
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enables public reactions whose very public-ness can turn out to be signifi-
cant in an ethical sense.
３ The control function of laughter: Walter Benjamin on
mutual monitoring
In section XII of the artwork essay Benjamin maintains that the technolo-
gical reproducibility of the artwork changes the relation between the
masses and art. In response to a traditional art like painting, which has
lost its social impact, the response of the audience (Publikum) is split
between critique and enjoyment; there are the experts, and there are the
uncritical masses. For Benjamin this divergence is retrograde, but not so
for a new art like film where the response becomes progressive because the
critical attitude and the pleasure of watching and experiencing emotion-
ally coincide: ‘[t]he progressive attitude is characterized by an immediate,
intimate fusion of pleasure – pleasure in seeing and experiencing with an
attitude of expert appraisal.’１９ For Benjamin this is particularly true in the
case of Chaplin comedies and slapstick films. Why should watching The
Circus (1928) be progressive and the reaction to paintings by Picasso be
retrograde? For the moment let me hasten to say that for Benjamin it is key
that film viewing is a simultaneous collective experience, whereas looking at
a painting implies an individual encounter. Even in those cases when large
amounts of beholders look at paintings in galleries and salons they do not
do so simultaneously and collectively. Benjamin points out that, unlike the
cinema, galleries and salons do not allow the masses to organise and con-
trol themselves in their response.２０ Although he remains vague at this
point we might surmise that this lack of organisation and mutual monitor-
ing derives from the structural differences between the two dispositifs: in
the cinema a co-present group of people watches the uninterrupted un-
folding of a 90-minute film collectively, whereas in the gallery and salon
everyone decides for him or herself how long he or she remains in front of a
painting. Consequently, there is a lack of synchronisation of responses and
as a result the beholders cannot mutually control their reactions.
Why do critique and pleasure coincide at the movies? Benjamin an-
swers:
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[t]he decisive reason is that nowhere more than in the cinema are the reactions
of individuals, which add up to the massive reaction of the audience, from the
onset determined by their imminent concentration and aggregation. By
becoming public they control one another.２１
Since this passage is just as convoluted as it is complex I will try to disen-
tangle it step by step. First, it is important to note that the reactions of the
individuals can, in sum, create a massive audience reaction. Of course this
cannot be true for each and every response. It is hard to fathom how
collective feelings of beauty or boredom should add up to a massive reac-
tion, but the argument certainly goes for expressive responses like scream-
ing or laughter, as we shall see.
Furthermore, from the very beginning these individual reactions are
shaped by the fact that they will agglomerate and become part of an over-
arching response of the audience as a whole. Consciously or subcon-
sciously, the viewers attend to the fact that others will presumably respond
in a similarly expressive way. Knowing that their reactions will add up to a
mass response the spectators calibrate for this expected outcome. Remain-
ing with Benjamin’s example of Chaplin, precisely because viewers expect
that others will also respond with laughter do they express their amuse-
ment by laughing out loud. If they were to watch the film alone (as under
today’s solitary viewing conditions) they would not anticipate a collective
response and therefore refrain from attuning their response to an ‘immedi-
ate concentration and agglomeration’. They may be highly amused by and
smile at Chaplin but ultimately they would remain mostly silent; laughing
alone in the living room can be an awkward experience. Hence in this
passage Benjamin seems to be astutely aware of what I call the audience
effect: the effect co-present others can have on our viewing experience. This
becomes all the more evident when we take into account a sentence Mir-
iam Hansen refers to in which Benjamin claims ‘words, gestures, events
perceived by the masses are different from those perceived by indivi-
duals’.２２ As part of a group of people individuals often register things dif-
ferently than when they are alone – and they may also respond in a differ-
ent way when they are amongst others.
Most important for our purposes in this section on the ethical implica-
tions of the audience effect is the final sentence ‘indem sie sich kundgeben,
kontrollieren sie sich / by becoming public they [the individual reactions]
control one another’. What does Benjamin mean to say here? I doubt that
he refers to a control of affects in the sense of a suppression of the emo-
tional reaction. He is unlikely to aim at a leveling of affective responses on
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the personal and social level in the way Norbert Elias does it in The Civiliz-
ing Process.２３ For one, the German verb ‘kundgeben’ implies ‘to make
something known’ or, even more to the point, ‘to make something public’
(the noun ‘Kundgebung’ is a synonym for demonstration or rally).２４ Hence
we could infer that Benjamin may have claimed that if (and only if) audi-
ence responses become public in the movie theater others can control
them and judge them as misguided or even ethically problematic; the
viewer reveals and makes publically available what he or she finds funny
and deems worthy of laughter.２５ The reactions of the others, once they are
out there, are in turn themselves subject to scrutiny. We could even argue
that there may be instances when people become critical of their own
response precisely because of its collective character. For instance, the
viewer can despise the fact that he or she has laughed about something
with the other viewers that he or she should not have laughed about – be it
for reasons of peer pressure or due to involuntary emotional contagion.
This is a point shared by philosopher Simon Critchley, who writes that
[p]erhaps one laughs at jokes one would rather not laugh at. Humour can
provide information about oneself that one would rather not have.２６
The word ‘control’ today often used in conjunction with the ‘disciplinary
societies’ (Foucault) or the ‘societies of control’ (Deleuze) – thus connoted
negatively – to me has a much more positive ring in Benjamin’s text.２７ It is
at this point that we can understand why Benjamin considered the cinema
more progressive than a traditional art like painting. In the movie theater
the viewer can enjoy the film and at the same time remain critical because
he or she monitors the potentially questionable or ethically-dangerous
responses of other viewers (and also his or her own reaction).２８ Again,
Critchley is apposite here:
[t]he reactionary quality of much humour, in particular ethnic humour, must
be analysed . . . in its ‘untruth’, as it were, reactionary humour tells us important
truths about who we are. Jokes can therefore be read as symptoms of societal
repression and their study might be said to amount to a return of the repressed.
In other words, humour can reveal us to be persons that, frankly, we would
rather not be.２９
This is not possible in front of a painting because the reception of paintings
does not take place collectively and simultaneously.
There is one more question that we have to address: how do these
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audience reactions become public? What Benjamin does not mention ex-
plicitly is the fact that his idea of publically available (and thus controlla-
ble) responses depends on expressive reactions and conspicuous behavior.
After all, the aforementioned structural features of the movie theater
(darkness, unidirectional seating position, backrest, etc.) make it difficult
to judge the responses of other viewers. Even in Benjamin’s time if a viewer
was deeply moved or embarrassed by a film these emotions were not read-
ily accessible to others – unless, of course, Benjamin would have thought of
an audience that communicated during the film and commented verbally
on what happened on the screen. In other words, Benjamin may have
modeled his preferred mode of reception on early cinema. This is at least
what Miriam Hansen suggests: ‘the difference from traditional art that
Benjamin ascribes to cinema’s relations of reception is more characteristic
of early cinema than of the classical paradigm that became hegemonic
after World War I’.３０ The early cinema mode of reception is, among other
things, characterised by distraction. As Hansen points out:
the artwork essay’s valorization of distraction (as opposed to the contemplative
reception of traditional works of art) presupposes a type of cinema experience
still patterned on the variety format, that is, the programming of shorter films
(interspersed with or framed by live performances) on the principle of max-
imum stylistic or thematic diversity.３１
But is this necessarily the case? I want to suggest a different reading here.
What Benjamin may have had ‘in mind’ is first and foremost an audience
responding expressively and conspicuously. This audience may be a dis-
tracted early-cinema-like one, but it can just as well imply a more ‘classical’
audience that screams in shock and, more importantly, that laughs out
loud and thus makes its response subject to public monitoring. Benjamin’s
many references to Charlie Chaplin and slapstick films (Groteskfilme) in
the artwork essay and elsewhere strongly support an interpretation along
these lines. For instance, we can glean the significance Benjamin ascribes
to laughter from his 1929 essay ‘Chaplin in Retrospect’. Benjamin ends this
essay with a remarkable quote:
[i]n his films, Chaplin appeals both to the most international and the most
revolutionary emotion of the masses: their laughter. ‘Admittedly,’ [Philippe]
Soupault says, ‘Chaplin merely makes people laugh. But aside from the fact that
this is the hardest thing to do, it is socially also the most important.’３２
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The important social weight of laughter can also be felt in the artwork
essay, albeit more implicitly. While Soviet montage cinema may be the
other important filmic reference point in this essay the films of Eisenstein
and Vertov are conspicuously absent in Benjamin’s discussion of the col-
lective experience in section XII. Here references to Chaplin and slapstick
films abound. Above I have mentioned the passage at the beginning of the
section in which Benjamin opposes the progressive response to Chaplin
with the retrograde reaction to Picasso. At the end of section XII he repeats
this opposition by likening the progressive response to slapstick films with
the regressive response to Surrealism.３３
Moreover, in a footnote Benjamin claims that ‘[b]efore the rise of the
movie the Dadaists’ performances tried to create an audience reaction
[eine Bewegung ins Publikum zu bringen] which Chaplin later evoked in a
more natural way.’３４ Unfortunately, the English translation glosses over a
crucial element: Benjamin does not refer to just any kind of audience
response, but to one that implies movement (Bewegung). In the case of
Chaplin this movement comes from laughter, shaking and stirring the
audience, as it were.３５ Bodies put into motion through amused laughter,
so memorably captured at the end of King Vidor’s The Crowd (1928), make
visibly manifest that the viewers find a scene funny.３６ Hence the audience
response can not only be heard but also seen via laughter. In an unpub-
lished fragment from 1934 titled ‘Hitler’s Diminished Masculinity’, written
shortly before the artwork essay, Benjamin had already pointed in a similar
direction. In this short fragment he likens the ‘masses’ moved to laughter by
a Chaplin comedy with the rigid masses of Nazi Germany: ‘Chaplin – the
ploughshare that cuts through the masses; laughter loosens up the mass/
the ground of the Third Reich is stamped down hard and firm, and no
more grass grows there.’３７ While Hitler’s dictatorship (and presumably
the huge rallies that became a hallmark of it) leads to dry, barren, and
suppressed uniformity, laughing about a Chaplin comedy creates a fertile
ground by temporarily shaking the rigid postures of the viewers.
Broadly speaking, we have to distinguish two functions that can be
deduced from Benjamin’s writings on laughter – call them the therapeutic
function and the control function. Drawing on the earliest handwritten
draft of the artwork essay, Miriam Hansen has discussed in admirable de-
tail Benjamin’s arguments about the mass-psychological release effects of
collective laughter.３８ In this draft Benjamin argues that it belongs to the
prime social functions of film to strike a balance between the human being
and technology, a balance knocked out of kilter precisely by modern tech-
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nology. Via the technology of film laughing about Mickey Mouse may
therefore acquire a healthy effect:
[i]f one takes into account the dangerous tensions which technification and its
consequences have engendered in the vast masses – tensions which, at critical
stages, take on a psychotic character – then one cannot but recognize that this
same technification has created as protection against such mass psychosis the
possibility of psychic inoculation by means of certain films in which a force
articulation of sadistic fantasies or masochistic delusions can prevent their
natural and dangerous ripening in the masses. The collective laughter signifies
a premature and therapeutic eruption of such mass psychoses, Benjamin
writes.３９
Ultimately, this therapeutic function has to remain highly speculative –
and it is not for no reason that it received severe criticism from Adorno:
‘The laughter of the cinema audience is . . . anything but good and revolu-
tionary; instead, it is full of the worst bourgeois sadism’.４０ Less speculative
is the control function of laughter. As we have seen, for Benjamin laughing
about – and thus responding in a vocal and motor fashion to – a slapstick
film or a contemporaneous Chaplin comedy like City Lights (1931) and
Modern Times (1936) implies a progressive reaction. Sitting in the movie
theater gives the audience a way to not only synchronise their reception
but also to monitor one another. The public space created through laugh-
ter allows for a positive kind of control, because inappropriate or even
ethically-questionable laughter becomes publically available – and thus a
matter of knowledge about what kind of opinions and judgments exist out
there. Alluding to a famous proverb, we might summarise Benjamin’s posi-
tion as both ‘tell me what you laugh about and I’ll tell you who you are’ and
‘tell me who you laugh with and I’ll tell you who you are’.
４ Conclusion
I think that a reading of Benjamin along these lines sheds an interesting
light on laughter in the cinema. However, we should not overlook the
potential pitfalls of Benjamin’s take on laughter. First, laughter itself is
not necessarily progressive; the audience effect can turn out to be regres-
sive when a viewer feels the ‘peer pressure’ of laughing along with a violent
event or a racist joke (and here one might heed Adorno’s warning as
well).４１ As I have argued above, knowing that their laughter will add up to
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a mass response, the spectators calibrate their reactions to this expected
collective response. Due to social desirability constraints this can happen
even against one’s own convictions; the viewer might laugh about some-
thing he or she might otherwise not find worthy of laughter at all. In fact, a
participant in an empirical study on audience behavior vis-à-vis cinematic
violence remembers:
[a] guy falls to his death and everybody laughed at that and I felt as if maybe I
should laugh with them, and I did. I can’t understand why I did that. I suppose
you try to fit in with everybody else so you’re not left out.４２
Admitting that there is no need to wax lyrical about the progressive poten-
tial of laughter does not affect the important control function of laughter in
the movie theater. First, as mentioned above, laughing along with others
due to peer pressure can spark a self-reflexive stance. The participant of the
empirical study clearly questions his laughter critically, and thus monitors
himself (albeit belatedly). Moreover, in some cases inappropriate laughter
can become the target of an explicit critical response from other viewers. In
her empirical study on violence Annette Hill found out that
[l]aughter is a common response participants notice and question. Certain
movies generate acceptable laughter, such as Pulp Fiction, whilst others, such as
Henry, Potrait of a Serial Killer do not, and to laugh at inappropriate places risks
censure from other members of the audience.４３
Last but not least, the monitoring function of laughter in the cinema re-
mains intact even in cases of peer pressure responses. Just because some-
one feels the need to comply with what he or she considers socially desir-
able does not release him or her from the responsibility for a questionable
act.
I hope that this article has helped to tease out some of the implications
hidden in Bazin’s seemingly simple statement that laughter makes the
audience aware of itself. It is in the movie theater that laughter raises a
collective awareness of a shared emotional judgment and puts this fact
entre nous; it is in the movie theater that questionable laughter can be
exposed and monitored; and it is in the movie theater that we become
collectively aware that we, as an audience, sometimes share certain values
and emotional judgments – and sometimes we do not.
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Notes
1 . Bazin 1967, p. 121.
2. I have given arguments for this point in Hanich 2010a and 2014.
3. To be sure, laughter is not the only expressive form of behavior that can create public
awareness. However, in this essay I concentrate on laughter alone.
4. Taylor 1980, p. 295.
5. Gilbert 2007, p. 7. Gilbert refers to Taylor 1985 (particularly chapter 10, section 3.1).
6. Taylor 1980, p. 293.
7. Ibid., p. 295.
8. Katz 1999, pp. 113-114.
9. Ibid., p. 117.
10. Neale & Krutnik 1990, p. 149.
1 1 . As Martin Jay points out, Julia Kristeva thought that if disrupted by laughter the cinema
can escape its complicity with authority and order. ‘If not for that demystification’, she
concluded, ‘the cinema would be nothing but another church.’ See Jay 1993, p. 85.
12. Taylor 1980, p. 294.
13. Plessner 1970, p. 146.
14. As Erving Goffman once pointed out, ‘silence, coming from a person in a situation
where participants are obliged to be busily engaged in tasks or talk, can itself be a
noisy thing, loudly expressing that the individual is not properly involved and not
attuned to the gathering; this silent kind of noise can distract attention, just as the
loud kind can’. Goffman 1963, p. 214.
15. I have offered a typology of cinematic laughter and some of the functions these types of
laughter imply in Hanich 2010b.
16. Provine 2004, p. 215.
17. See Zijderveld 1983, p. 253.
18. See Lorenz 1953.
19. Benjamin 2008, p. 36.
20. Benjamin: ‘Although paintings began to be publicly exhibited in galleries and salons,
there was no way for the masses to organize and control themselves in their reception.
Thus the same public which responds in a progressive manner toward a grotesque film
is bound to respond in a reactionary manner to surrealism.’ Benjamin 1969, p. 235.
21 . The German version reads: ‘Und zwar ist der entscheidende Umstand dabei: nirgends
mehr als im Kino erweisen sich die Reaktionen der Einzelnen, deren Summe die mas-
sive Reaktion des Publikums ausmacht, von vornherein durch ihre unmittelbare Mas-
sierung bedingt. Und indem sie sich kundgeben, kontrollieren sie sich.’ Benjamin 1977
(‘Kunstwerk’), p. 33 (the above translation is mine).
22. Benjamin 1977 (Gesammelte Werke), p. 1193 (my translation). Mentioned in Hansen
2012, p. 100.
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23. See Elias 1994.
24. This is the reason why my translation reads as follows: ‘By becoming public they control
one another.’ Other translators have rendered the passage as ‘no sooner are these
reactions manifest than they regulate one another’ (E. Jephcott & H. Zohn in Benjamin
2008, p. 36) or ‘the moment these responses become manifest they control each other’
(H. Zohn in Benjamin 1969, p. 234).
25. For slightly different interpretations of section XII in Benjamin’s artwork essay see
Hansen 2012, p. 100 and McBride 1998, p. 469.
26. Critchley 2002, p. 74.
27. See Foucault 1995; Deleuze 1992.
28. Why this should be the case ‘nowhere more than in the cinema’ – and not also, for
instance, in stage comedies – remains open in Benjamin’s text.
29. Critchley 2002, p. 12. He continues: ‘[j]okes can be read in terms of what or simply who a
particular society is subordinating, scapegoating or denigrating. Grasping the nature of
societal repression can itself be liberating, but only negatively.’ Critchley 2002, pp. 75-
76.
30. Hansen 2012, p. 86.
31 . Ibid.
32. Benjamin 2008, p. 337 (translated by R. Livingstone). In German: ‘Chaplin hat sich in
seinen Filmen an den zugleich internationalsten und revolutionärsten Affekt der Mas-
sen gewandt, das Gelächter. “Allerdings”, sagt Soupault, “Chaplin bringt nur zum La-
chen. Aber abgesehen davon, daß das das Schwerste ist, was es gibt, ist es auch im
sozialen Sinne das Wichtigste.”’.
33. Curiously, Hansen does not discuss these allusions. The fact that she overlooks Benja-
min’s references to comedies is symptomatic of the general problem that the genre
poses for the neat divide between early cinema and classical cinema. Since 1895 come-
dies transcend the boundaries between film historical periods. Moreover, even if the
mode of address of the comedy may have changed throughout the decades its laughing
audiences are hardly the absorbed, voyeuristic spectators often deemed typical for the
classical paradigm.
34. Benjamin 1969, p. 250 (translated by H. Zohn).
35. In the German original Benjamin notes: ‘Ehe der Film zur Geltung kam, suchten die
Dadaisten durch ihre Veranstaltungen eine Bewegung ins Publikum zu bringen, die ein
Chaplin dann auf natürlichere Weise hervorrief.’ Benjamin 1977 (‘Kunstwerk’), p. 37
(emphasis added).
36. In the late 1920s the film theorist and critic Rudolf Arnheim once turned around in the
movie theater in order to follow the audience rather than the film. His comments antici-
pate what Benjamin would say a couple of years later: ‘Die Körper liegen als dunkle
Klumpen schwer und unbeweglich in bequemen Stühlen . . . Manchmal geht ein Geläch-
ter durch das Dunkel, dann wiegen sich alle die Körper eine Weile hin und her, so als
wenn der Wind durch die Bäume geht.’ Quoted from: Paech & Paech 2000, p. 133.
37. Benjamin 1999, p. 792.
38. See Hansen 1993.
39. Quoted from Hansen 1993, pp. 31-32.
40. Ibid., p. 32. In a famous letter Adorno had warned Benjamin against romanticising the
sadistic impulses in the audience response to Mickey Mouse.
41 . I thank Thijs Lijster for this helpful suggestion.
42. Quoted from Hill 1997, p. 29.
43. Ibid.
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